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Abstract: This contribution addresses an emergent research agenda for critical theory and 
research into state crime in the context of two domains in which state and non-state 
actors are reinventing their terms of engagement, roles and responsibilities under inter-
national law: (1) governments’ responses to the suffering of the thousands dying at sea 
on the doorstep of the EU and (2) the cyberspatial dimensions to border enforcement and 
related practices of surveillance and cybersecurity measures from the perspective of how 
human rights are rendered in digital, networked contexts. Drawing on reconsiderations 
of Foucault’s thought on the underlying schizoid tendencies of modern statecraft, I argue 
that identifying perpetrators of state crime and the related embedding of mass online 
surveillance lie at the epicentre of how critical scholars, activists, and judiciaries consider 
the ways that people use digital and networked devices and systems and how these can 
be used to undermine fundamental rights and freedoms, not only of millions of forcibly 
displaced persons but also those of all “netizens”. The article concludes by considering 
where openings for (digital) resistance lie in the face of these shifting constellations of 
state/non-state “collectives” as they patrol the online–offline nexus of contemporary 
borderzones.
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Life and Death at the Border: “Access Denied”
In the lead-up to the 2016 national referendum in the UK, a campaign poster from 
the pro-Brexit, anti-immigration UK Independence Party (UKIP) caused a furore. 
It superimposed the slogan “Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all” over a 
photo of hundreds of (conspicuously non-White) people waiting in a queue some-
where at the Slovenian border. Mounted onto trucks and vans, this poster was 
being driven around the UK in the week that the anti-Brexit Labour MP, Jo Cox, 
was assassinated by a British nationalist. Timing aside, this image cleverly 
exploited deep divisions about the freedom-of-movement provisions of EU mem-
bership.1 It made explicit sentiments about keeping the unwanted “Other” out – 
of the UK and, in turn, evoked the desire to get the UK out – of the EU (Stewart 
and Mason 2016; Lowe 2016; Rashid 2017). In so doing, it encapsulated 
the psycho-emotional, and with that the racial and religious dimensions to the 
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anti-immigration rhetoric, and anxieties about national identity and citizenship 
undergirding this referendum. The spectrum of responses to this image within the 
UK resonated with comparable debates elsewhere in the European Union.
Meanwhile thousands of people – mostly from the Global South – continue to 
flee their homes, seeking refuge from war and violent civil conflicts, if not from 
famine, endemic poverty and effects of climate change. These population move-
ments are not emanating from within Europe, as was the case after the Second 
World War – events that led to several international conventions on human and 
refugee rights, or in the 1990s, during the civil war in the Balkans. Contemporary, 
post-9/11 policy politics around refugees and migration reveal how the EU as a 
whole and individual member states have been found wanting in their response to 
the humanitarian crisis currently unfolding on their doorstep (Muižnieks 2017; 
World Bank 2017).2 EU member states – signatories to international treaties and 
conventions on the rights of refugees, the rights of migrants and concomitant 
human rights – are destinations of choice (required by law to honour these obliga-
tions), as well as of necessity (being the closest in that regard) at the end of a long 
road. Making it to a country that is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
means passing through a number of gateways, obstacle courses that are at once 
physical, psychological, judicial and, as this article argues, increasingly digitized 
and globally networked. The net effect is that burgeoning trans-border cybersecu-
rity apparatuses are able to locate and then track the refugee/migrant “Other” as a 
digitally verifiable miscreant, violent interloper in ways that escape public scrutiny, 
legal forms of redress or political accountability. The human suffering taking place 
in these maritime, air-patrolled, and land-based “biopolitical borderzones” (Topak 
2014, 2017) underscores both a lack of political resolve and, in some cases, open 
hostility to accepting refugees from national legislatures and in Brussels. Evidence 
of human rights abuses over the last few years at the borders of Europe is, instead, 
being collected by NGOs, researchers, and activists to call to account not only indi-
vidual states but also consortiums of private agents, and border-enforcement 
authorities operating transnationally under the aegis of the EU.
Aims and Organization
These life and death scenarios provide the critical point of entry for this contribu-
tion. Its main objective is to outline a research agenda that can take into account 
the emergence of these digitally adept and computer-networked gatekeepers – 
human and automated – now patrolling the inner and outer borderlands of the EU 
and “managing” the arrival of thousands of refugees. These gatekeepers are 
charged with enforcing policies of deterrence, search and rescue (SAR) operations 
and eventual processing, detention or deportation of these arrivals – those that 
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survive the journey. These actors take two forms. First are the private, military 
and/or security companies (PMSCs; Bures and Carrapico 2017) that work on 
behalf of state agencies under contract. G4S is one example, contracted in the UK 
and in Australia to run detention centres and deportations. Second are organiza-
tions established by EU regulations with a mandate to enforce EU-wide policy, 
controlling the Schengen border in this case. The recently re-established European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, which still goes by its former name – Frontex, 
is the main EU agency in this regard. Its mission is ostensibly “to promote, coor-
dinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental 
rights charter and the concept of Integrated Border Management” (Frontex – 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency 2018, emphasis added).3 As its powers 
and budget steadily increase, this agency’s human rights track record has been the 
object of criticism by networks representing the rights of refugees since as far back 
as 2007 (ECRE 2007; International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty 
International 2016). Nonetheless, in recognition of political pressure from within 
the EU to respond more “robustly” to the numbers of asylum seekers attempting 
to cross the Mediterranean, this two-pronged approach – the privatization and cen-
tralization of border control, detention and deportation activities – plays a central 
role in both EU and national policy agendas and public discourses, which effec-
tively conflate the plight of refugees and right to asylum with broader political 
debates about immigration within the EU.
The tools and – land, sea and aerial – systems that are being developed and 
deployed to monitor and confine the movement of incoming populations are depend-
ent on Internet-based media and communications that include a range of military, 
policing and civil uses. In the second instance, they are inseparable from micro-
level, bio-engineered and macro-level satellite-linked means for locating, scanning, 
classifying and patrolling an individual, group or space of interest, for example, by 
using GPS and geo-sensing techniques, military drones and other sorts of automated 
sensing devices to patrol, or target any given surface or vessel, and so make visible 
and digitally render human lives as data categories. In this regard, practices of border 
control and national security – deterrence, detention and processing – are more and 
more proximate to everyday policing as law enforcement and intelligence services 
become increasingly intertwined in the name of anti-terrorism measures for national/
regional security priorities (Balleste 2015; Council of Europe 2014; Baumann et al. 
2014; Necessary and Proportionate 2013).
The issues that this article addresses with respect to this current state of affairs 
fall under two rubrics.4 The first covers the role of digital/networked technologies 
in cases of violence, neglect or complicity that implicate individual state agencies, 
or EU agencies, that lead to the deaths of innocent people at any particular point 
along the routes they take to reach safe haven. The roll-out of punitive surveillance 
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programs dovetails the embedding of commercial and government-sponsored 
tools and systems for large-scale tracking, collecting and retention of the everyday 
communications of citizenries. Second, is how these top-down rationales and 
techniques of a burgeoning “internet governmentality complex” (Franklin 2013) 
operate with but also alongside digital devices with Internet connections and so 
access to web-based information and social networks. These services also provide 
a means of survival and enable support networks for those undertaking these jour-
neys. These, in turn, can be repurposed for campaigning, mobilization against 
inhumane treatment and detention conditions on the ground, as well as deployed 
for conducting investigative research for legal action.5
The dual purposing that undergird these trends in how borders are perceived, 
policed and then crossed presents challenges for studying the modus operandi and 
locales in which cases of state crime may now be taking place. It means drawing 
together streams of research and activism that have proceeded along parallel tra-
jectories to date, namely, inquiries into migration and asylum that re-deploy digi-
tal tools and imaging technologies to expose repressive and excessive recourses to 
“law and order”, those focusing on refugee/human rights mobilization on one 
hand and, on the other hand, on research and mobilization around human rights in 
Internet policymaking consultations that address design, access and use, and data-
management issues. All these domains have a bearing on how state crime research 
may look to address where accountability lies for the inhumane treatment of dis-
placed populations at any point along journeys that now unfold at the online–
offline nexus. These streams are also converging at an historical juncture in the 
international state system that political theorists have dubbed as “post-national” in 
the European context (Habermas 2001) or “post-Westphalian” (Fraser 2007) in 
the broader sense. Within this longer-term dynamic, policy paralysis around a 
common EU immigration policy contrasts with burgeoning agreements over bor-
der and cybersecurity measures between some EU member states and those bor-
dering the African continent’s shorelines of the Mediterranean. 
If specific software applications, system architectures and personalized devices 
are now indispensable for the maintenance and extension of punitive forms of bor-
der security, then they need to be incorporated into debates around defining and 
pursuing cases of state crime on one hand and, on the other, human rights norms 
and jurisprudence (Pillay 2014; Ward and Green 2016; Vincent 2010). After pro-
viding an overview of the statistical and categorical dimensions to these population 
movements according to UN records, I consider the conceptual challenges of these 
politically and ethically controversial undertakings for the study of state crime in 
domains characterized by the embedding of computer-networked tools and proce-
dures in the redesign of immigration and asylum policies across the EU. Developing 
previous work (Franklin 2013, 2015) and mindful of other contributions in this 
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series, this discussion considers recent re-engagements with Michel Foucault’s 
work in light of his thinking on modern statecraft as schizoid as one way of address-
ing these cross-cutting issues. These schizoid tendencies are encapsulated by the 
evolving armouries of public/privately funded apparatuses of population control at 
home overlaid by measures that strive to keep other populations out. The first looks 
inwards (to citizens and residents); the second surveys outwards (to prospective 
residents and “newcomer” citizens). Both are being justified by discourses fuelling 
imaginaries of unease and anxiety towards the racially and religiously encoded 
stranger. Waves of orchestrated and “lone wolf” or “home-grown” terrorist attacks 
around Europe fuel these imaginaries and serve to bolster national (cyber)security 
procedures. This state of mind is underscored by ongoing squabbling at the EU 
level between member states over their roles and responsibilities under interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law; responsibilities that include ensuring 
that no one is “subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment”.6
Debates about challenges to the historical incumbency of states’ ability to exer-
cise their sovereignty over citizenries are linked to the rise in economic reach and 
persuasive powers of this century’s global corporations that own and control the 
lion’s share of Internet goods and services, terms of access and use, and data man-
agement. Powerful Internet service providers, social media platforms as well as 
software developers and equipment manufacturers control the infrastructures that 
facilitate how borders are managed and how people make sense of their world and 
find their way as they traverse routes in and out of economic and national jurisdic-
tions. The global market share and reach that these tech giants, or “economic sov-
ereigns” as Rebecca McKinnon (2014) argues, have on everyday life for billions 
of their “netizens” arguably rival the ability of national and local authorities to 
influence and inform their citizenries and constituencies respectively.7 As defini-
tions of state crime continue to be refined (Ross 2000; Ward and Green 2016),8 
jurisprudence is still in its early stages with regard to successful prosecutions for 
digital or any other infractions by state and corporate actors with regard to recent 
recognition at the UN level that human rights exist online as they do, in principle 
and in law, offline (UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 2014; Statewatch 2013; 
Bowcott 2015).
Legal Statistical Narratives of Suffering
The current humanitarian crisis signalled by agencies such as the World Bank, the 
UN and human rights organizations is being conveyed through the web, reported 
and responded to along a variety of digital media axes, news and organizational 
channels. News outlets, international organizations charged with refugee and 
other humanitarian aid, national governments, the various organs of the European 
Commission and UN agencies refer to these forced movements of people as 
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refugees and/or asylum seekers, or migrants in often conflicting ways. These dif-
ferent terms of reference (Amit and Landau 2016; Braithwaite 2016; Guterres 
2015) point to the underlying political implications of legal categories in the face 
of calls for individual governments, and the EU as a whole, to take concerted 
action to address the ensuing human suffering. Legal clarities belie, however, the 
opaqueness of application in practice. As Michael Møller, Director General of the 
United Nations Office at Geneva argues,
There should be no misunderstanding between refugees and economic migrants…
[yet]…the terms refugee and migrant have been put into the same salad. To put it 
very bluntly, every refugee is a migrant. Not every migrant is a refugee. (Cited in 
Ridley 2016)
These statistics bear some mention at this point because they provide quanti-
fiers of these categories which, in turn, underscore a host of political stress points 
about the socio-legal ramifications of this humanitarian crisis. Labels as well as 
statistics matter as they not only carry but also nuance the rhetoric of crisis, threat 
and security, providing signifiers of tolerable versus undesirable supplicants. First, 
according to the UN Refugee Agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, the end of 2014 signalled a sharp jump in the number of people on the 
road after being forcibly displaced from their homes, from 52.2 to 59.5 million. 
In other words, one out of every 122 human beings at this time was either a refu-
gee, internally displaced or seeking asylum (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 2016), half of which were children. In the following year, largely due 
to ten major armed conflicts, the number of people forcibly displaced around the 
world had risen to over 65 million, equivalent to the total UK population (World 
Bank 2017). To put it another way, over the past 10 years, more people in the world 
have been displaced than at any other period in modern times, increasing fourfold, 
from about 11,000 a day in 2011 to 44,000 per day 4 years later.9 In the one month 
of October 2015, the number of refugees entering the EU by sea – media focus on 
the Italian islands such as Lampedusa having shifted to the Greek islands of Kos, 
Lesbos, amongst others – was equivalent to the total over the whole of 2014: 53 
per cent of which were Syrian.
These numbers underscore the skewed geographies of asylum provisions. It is 
not the wealthier parts of the world that are confronted with the need for immedi-
ate and longer-term responses to the arrival of thousands of traumatized, exhausted 
people. Host states in the Global South carry the heaviest burden, registered at 
hosting 86 per cent of the world’s refugees; across the Syrian border in Lebanon 
for instance, one in three or four people is a refugee. These hosts include a number 
of “Least Developed Countries” that are dealing with around 26 per cent of this 
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total (UNHCR 2015; Elliot 2016). This skewed geography is reflected within, and 
around the EU. In this case, in the arrival figures for those taking the sea and land 
routes to the borders of the larger European continent (stretching from Greece and 
Turkey into the Baltic States and onwards into Scandinavia), the burden of recep-
tion, lodging, legal processing and then management of the eventual transit of the 
thousands reaching these shorelines are borne by Greece and the southern member 
states of the EU; Italy, Hungary and the Balkan states in particular. Within the 
richer parts of Western Europe, Germany has accepted 60 per cent of the recorded 
applications for asylum (Eurostat 2017).
But it is the death toll, particularly at sea, over the last few years that signals the 
scale of magnitude at one end of the human spectrum and, at the other, national 
and intergovernmental conflicts over immigration further “up-stream”. Moreover, 
mass deaths by drowning, if not by dehydration and exhaustion, are being recorded 
live, or reconstructed, and uploaded onto dedicated websites, national news and 
commercial social media outlets. Images of capsized boats, unseaworthy and 
over-full vessels of all descriptions drifting in the Mediterranean and Aegean 
Seas, bodies washed up on the shore, exhausted and drenched passengers in flimsy, 
useless life-jackets being pulled on to coastguard boats, or taken on board by 
fisher folk and other private vessels defying their own national anti-human traf-
ficking laws have been headline news.10 The controversial record of EU SAR 
missions in these cases have been termed a form of “death by rescue” by critical 
research into the processes by which refugee boats may be located but not inter-
cepted (Heller and Pezzani 2014). Within current EU member states, and in 
Brussels, debates about whether SAR undertakings are in themselves encouraging 
more people to make these journeys permeate public and policy discourses.11 The 
jurisdictional complexities, and with that the political tensions on the ground, 
pivot on who bears the responsibility of being the first point of entry for the thou-
sands being washed up on the beaches of southern Europe’s holiday destinations. 
As these arguments grind on in national legislatures, at the European Commission 
in Brussels and European Parliament in Strasbourg, and also in High Courts 
around the region, they contribute to the increasingly inhumane waiting times and 
living conditions experienced by those hoping to continue onwards.
Multi-sited Gatekeeping Powers
Discussing the digital, predominantly though not necessarily networked tools and 
procedures that are now commonplace at the points of entry and exit along any 
national or regional (as is the case of the EU Schengen zone) border may appear 
far removed from the body count of drowned asylum seekers. These tools and 
everyday communications devices – the most important “non-food item” that 
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people take with them, may seem contingent upon, rather than determining aspects 
of the physical properties of the shorelines, maritime and airspaces that coastguard 
or land-based border authorities patrol. But in the context of ongoing policies of 
digitizing strategic infrastructures, security and government services, they play an 
under-theorized role in the cat-and-mouse game that characterizes how asylum 
seekers are received, processed and their personal data archived and considered by 
would-be host countries, humanitarian organizations, UN agencies, and courts of 
law (Aarstad 2017; Bosilica 2016; Boulanin 2013; Bowden 2013). In line with 
legal reconsiderations of how Internet infrastructure recalibrates state security 
measures and cross-border law enforcement, these computer-dependent powers 
have been challenging longstanding notions about national sovereignty and rule of 
law as these, in turn, have been reconsidered for forging international agreement 
over responsibility and accountability for combating climate change, and custodi-
anship over outer space, the world’s oceans and polar regions.
Despite a number of UN Resolutions, multilateral expressions of human rights 
principle for “the online environment” (UNHRC 2014), the EU and its member 
states have been deepening and expanding the existing borders in two ways: 
(1) beyond conventional national territorial boundaries into others’ jurisdictions 
by setting up processing/detention centres in places such as Libya (as is the case 
with Italy), or Turkey (with Germany), and entering into detention centre “shar-
ing” arrangements with African Saharan states (as is the case with the UK) and (2) 
by the increasingly public relations dimensions to off-the-shelf and tailor-made 
procedures and equipment for digitally enhanced border controls and immigra-
tion, identity checks by state and outsourced border and detention agents. It is no 
longer sufficient for twenty-first-century statecraft just to patrol the gates and con-
tingent interiors of borderzones. It is possible to push these out as well as drill 
down, deeper into the individual body, familial and community spaces that com-
prise both citizenries and undocumented, precarious populations waiting the out-
come of lengthy application procedures. The computing and data-retention power 
is available to record, file and sift through the vast databases that ensue. Commercial 
and governmental forms of digitized identification, infrared and other forms of 
enhanced visioning technologies, authentication toolkits and computerized secu-
rity and monitoring systems and machinery are all on the market; for large-scale 
(aerial) and hand-held (night-vision and body-heat sensors) situations.
The “big data” and artificial intelligence dimensions to the information that can 
be extrapolated from these tailor-made tools, as well as from ordinary – mobile 
phone and other computing – devices with inbuilt geo-tracking capabilities, are 
increasingly embedded in the practices of contemporary statecraft. Ascertaining the 
rights and privileges of citizenship and residency within national jurisdictions now 
dovetail with the policing of customs and “free movement” provisions, biometric 
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passports accompany digitalized library cards, online visa or welfare applications 
and other sorts of networked topologies of legitimation in schools, universities and 
health services (Bosilica 2016). This move to digitized surveillance-by-design con-
nects the policing of the “inside” and “outside” spaces that constitute conventional 
legal understandings of landed and maritime border jurisdictions – “technologies of 
extraterritorialization” as Joseph Pugliese (2013) argues. These horizontal plane-
tary surfaces are now interconnected vertically via satellite technologies and air-
borne, automated devices such as drones. The topographical intelligence and digital 
databases that ensue are made possible through emerging technologies of calcula-
tion that can scan, mine and increasingly connect once-separate databases together. 
These are now the object of computing R&D looking to refine techniques (using 
algorithms) for collating, sorting and monitoring where human beings are going, 
predict where they might go, what they might do next.
In this respect, the work of critical legal scholars on state crime in the Latin 
American region can be informative. Cruz (2016) for instance argues for the need 
to bring
the state back into the analysis of criminal violence by examining the many ways 
in which the state directly contributes to violence….[For example] by extending 
the legal limits of the use of legitimate force, by tolerating and supporting the 
employment of extra-legal approaches to deal with crime and disorder… while 
seeking legitimacy and constructing political authority. (Cruz 2016: 375)
The case extension and expansion of border controls hundreds of kilometres 
out from the putative borders of “Fortress Europe” underscore Cruz’s points as 
these functions are increasingly outsourced to private actors and automated pro-
cesses. As another Latin American legal scholar observes, the privatization of 
gatekeeping at or within any putative borders also absolves said state actor from 
being directly involved in the deaths. In other words, the “State does not kill di-
rectly unwanted groups of individuals. Rather, the State lets them die” (França 
2014, 2017; Bures and Carrapico 2017; Heller and Pezzani 2014).
Political, Legal, Conceptual Challenges
The above developments point to a triple problematic for critical theory and 
research into the state crime, refugee crisis and technology nexus of cause, effect 
and eventual accountability. Digital tools and computer-networked systems have 
a formative, indeed proactive and penetrative role to play in the embodied, physi-
cal and emotional toll of forced displacement. As noted earlier, they also have a 
role to play in how people survive against all odds and how support networks on 
the ground and online provide technical and other forms of support and sustenance 
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for those in need, as well as look to develop counter-narratives to compete for 
social and broadcast media headlines.12
The first of these challenges concerns shifts from physical to computer-generated 
and mediated geographies of direct and outsourced exercises of customary sover-
eign power and control over any population, underscored by techniques of revisu-
alization recorded by drones, satellites and hand-held devices such as mobile 
phone video footage. These are redrawing the cartographies upon which 
Westphalian legal, political and economic idioms of national sovereignty over a 
geographically delimited jurisdiction rest. Hard and soft law, liberal Western 
jurisprudence and concomitant debates in social and political theory underscore 
the geopolitical and institutional histories that legitimize state agency as contin-
gent upon physical territory. International jurisprudence that is premised on cus-
tomary law is being confronted by the legal challenges that these digital, networked 
interfaces and online archives of evidence present to judiciaries as the outcome of 
law enforcement and intelligence gathering based on data “harvesting” and digi-
talized forms of knowledge exchange, or intelligence sharing. However, these 
same representatives of (inter-)governmental security measures take part in 
Internet policymaking agendas that have been under pressure to incorporate 
human rights standards in any future visions for how Internet technologies will be 
deployed for the purposes of state or regional security (Necessary and Proportionate 
2013; La Rue 2011; Council of Europe 2014; Internet Rights and Principles 
Coalition 2018). In this regard, if the human rights of citizens are now recognized 
as having substantive meaning online and, thereby, with implications for future 
interpretations of existing international law, then it follows that so should the rights 
of displaced populations under international humanitarian law also be recognized 
as having an online – digital and networked – dimension.
These developments – the first is now public record in UNHRC Resolutions, 
whilst the second remains moot, signal another challenge. Much of the theory and 
research literature still pivots on taking a normative position along an implicit, 
ontological hierarchy between “real life” offline versus online – virtual – social 
and economic relations. Meanwhile, at this online–offline nexus, an emerging 
politico-legal order is deploying digital, geolocational forms of population control 
and casual surveillance on a planetary scale linking national jurisdictional conven-
tions with programs of co-operation over extraterritorial techniques of both popu-
lation (viz. border) control and (cyber)security measures. These techniques link 
the audio-visual monitoring of public and private spaces (with CCTV for instance) 
to people’s personal data (at customs, at work, at school) to larger scale forms of 
pre-emptive surveillance (communications data retention as the rule rather than 
the exception). Legal scholars, human rights and digital privacy activists have 
been quick to signal the dangers of this mission creep in the last few years but have 
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yet to consciously link the ensuing erosion of fundamental rights and liberties for 
citizens to their blatant disregard in the case of displaced populations.
With respect to who or what sort of legal entity can or should carry liability in 
these scenarios, there also needs to be a reconceptualization of state agencies not 
only as representatives of singular sovereign state actors but also as “state-actor 
collectives” (Ward and Green 2016) that also include those “non-state/state actor 
collectives” that operate, through outsourcing contracts, as government agents in 
the increasingly militarized and inhumane characteristics of border enforcement 
and immigration control. As the case of the death of Jimmy Mubenga in 2012 
shows (he died whilst being forcibly restrained on board a flight during his depor-
tation from the UK), governments rely on such agents, private firms largely, to 
enforce increasingly punitive immigration policies. The global reach of G4S, the 
aforementioned company employed by the UK to carry out this deportation – and 
whose employees were found guilty of the unlawful killing of Mr Mubenga, 
underscores the human rights implications of delegating these operations to poorly 
trained personnel, exacerbated by inadequate judicial oversight or transparency.13
The EU, taken here as a “state-actor collective” could also be regarded as a meta-
state actor given its unique status as an international body that requires its member 
states to submit to EU-level laws and policies and yet provides them with a venue in 
which they can assert national interests respectively. In either respect, within any 
sort of de facto or de jure “organizational” remit (Ross 2003: 2), these tactics of 
deterrence, containment and “repatriation” of effectively unwanted populations are 
thrown into relief as the EU effectively pays only lip service to its obligations under 
international law. Claims that there is some political support for a “cynical quid pro 
quo” (Howden and Fotiadis 2017) – by which the squalid conditions that character-
ize reception and processing of refugees are regarded as a form of deterrence – 
remain moot legally speaking. Meanwhile some governments rely on public support 
for taking a tougher, more inhospitable line towards displaced populations gathering 
at or around national borders; fire-hoses being turned on to prevent people crossing 
into southern Europe, the recent violent clearing and dismantlement of the camp 
called “the Jungle” in Calais at the UK–French border in 2016, and constant harass-
ment of those sleeping rough in Europe’s capitals are cases in point.
If, following Ward and Green, the humanitarian crisis of these past years is 
unfolding in a “multileveled legal space” (2016: 229), this begs the question of 
how to ascertain new categories of “state-offenders” (Ross 2003) in an issue area 
that needs to be treated as a multi-sited one as well, given the role that social media 
outlets and other arbiters of “public opinion” now play in mitigating, or indeed in 
condoning anti-immigration measures that include the long-term incarceration, 
and violent deportation of out-processed asylum seekers. One line of thinking con-
siders the role of the “wider body politic” (Ross 2003: 2; Ward and Green 2016) 
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in calling offenders to account through legal action or public debate. But such 
body politics can also condone aggressive, even violent forms of deterrence and 
treatment of those deemed “non-citizens”, or turn a blind eye to the disproportion-
ate targeting of communities regarded as threats to cultural identity or groups seen 
to be threats to public order. The historical record is replete with these scenarios 
within living memory, in Europe particularly. Before proceeding, therefore, it 
behoves us to consider the following: What happens when said “wider body poli-
tic” does not recognize or remains impassive to evidence of “social harm, moral 
transgression, and/or civil or human rights violation” (Ross 2003: 2) as in the case 
of thousands dying at sea or in the appalling conditions of detention centres and 
camps dotted in and around the Schengen zone?
These conceptual and sociocultural conundrums are germane to any discussion 
of the digital/networked and, thereby, media dimensions to (1) possible abuses of the 
human rights of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants at any point in their 
respective applications for asylum, residency or citizenship; (2) how evidence is 
gathered about any such case and terms of its access and use; and (3) where and how 
best to mobilize on behalf of those subjected to human rights abuses across the full 
spectrum at any point in their journeys. The rest of this discussion will now consider 
some of the conceptual moves that follow from incorporating digital tools and com-
puter networks into critical analyses of EU immigration and refugee policy.
Reconceptualizing (Cyber)Security, (Unwanted) Populations, Territory
Unwanted populations arriving or moving en masse through traditional geographi-
cal territories are a visible and visceral challenge for authorities at any time. 
Theorists and philosophers have debated the legal and ethical limits to liberal 
democracies throughout the history of the modern nation state. The work of Michel 
Foucault continues to be influential in this regard. The multi-language publica-
tions of his collected works include all the lecture series he delivered at the Collège 
de France in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These have provided a wave of critical 
reconsiderations of his work on the shifting power dynamics of state–society rela-
tionships in the history of the (western European) nation state and concomitant 
lexicon: governmentality, biopolitics, discipline, surveillance and territory. These 
lectures, which can now be approached as a whole rather than in isolation, and 
how they feature in subsequent analyses in the secondary literature coincide with 
emerging debates in international law, political and social theory about the “cyber-
spatial” dimensions to how liberal governments aim to govern but, as Foucault 
(1978/1991) notes, “not too much”.14 From the perspective of state crime in a digi-
tal context, the time is ripe for considering how his thinking across all these lecture 
series can apprehend the present history of the nation state and its relationships 
with non-state actors, intergovernmental and other multilateral institutions as 
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these acquire digital, networked and, thereby, planetary characteristics of suprat-
erritoriality, cyberspatiality and transnational breadth and depth of form and sub-
stance (Scholte 2000; Deibert 2014; Franklin 2013).
Stuart Elden, a geographer, who focuses his reflections on the series delivered 
in 1977–1978 entitled Sécurité, Territoire, Population (Foucault 2004c) goes 
some way in considering how these more recent dynamics can be read back into 
Foucault’s ideas by asking, “what happens to territory?” (Elden 2007: 563). 
Taking these lectures as consecutive lines of thought, Elden argues that Foucault 
was losing sight of how disciplining powers as they refine their rationales and 
tools for targeting their respective populations necessarily aim to “securitize” and 
enclose space as “territory”. His claim is that Foucault puts aside his emphasis on 
geographical territory (how sovereign powers manage, discipline and so control 
populations within delimited physical space) to focus on how the agencies of sov-
ereign power look to manage, and so control populations (Elden 2007: 563, note 
2). Elden is concerned to retain the central notion that territory is
more than merely land, but a rendering of the emergent concept of “space” as a 
political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered, and 
controlled. Foucault’s notion of the politics of calculation is therefore crucial, but 
not as something which only manifests itself in population, but, rather, in territory 
too. (2007: 578)
He concludes that the “same kinds of mechanisms that Foucault looks at in 
relation to population are used to understand and control territory…[and]…in 
an era of security both territory and population are understood in a transformed 
sense” (Elden 2007: 578). If this counts for physical territories – political catego-
ries of space – then it can also count for those that are under formation, traversed 
in the online environment. To put it another way, the digital ability to patrol and so 
circumvent the inner and outer limits of any said physical territory (state borders, 
maritime borders, shorelines) implies an additional genus of politics, digitized 
operations that reconfigure existing jurisdictional “politics of calculation” (Elden 
2007: 578) and, with that, cyberspatiality as a digitally rendered political category 
of space in which differently constituted “populations” become evident.
These concepts and the power “dispositifs” and “calculs” they engender, in 
which locales and in which forms, are also pertinent to questions about whether 
the plight of 65 million displaced persons can be considered under the rubric of 
state crime, namely through interrogations of military and commercialized 
deployments of digital and networked technologies of population control that 
rely on (online) surveillance. Refugees, “economic migrants”, and asylum seek-
ers are also populations, citizens of somewhere if not unwanted arrivals 
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elsewhere. Their movements through and across any number of territorial juris-
dictions – cyberspatial, landed or maritime – are in this respect the object of exist-
ing forms of state actions, as well as leading to all manner of intergovernmental 
undertakings to facilitate “innovations”. They also provide motivation for vari-
ous countermanding practices: humanitarian actions and activist campaigns. 
Space is the operative word here, a term that has a long and rich literature of its 
own addressing Foucault’s work and the thought of his contemporaries. As one 
of these contemporaries noted, in a much-cited phrase, “space is practised place” 
(De Certeau 1984: 117). The implications of regarding territorial jurisdiction as 
more than the sum of landed parameters and concomitant spaces with a pre-given 
physical essence allows for a conceptual bridge between the ontological hierar-
chy of value often attributed to “offlineness” as superior to “onlineness”. It allows 
for thinking to move past the convention of treating territory as a fixed “political 
category of space”, with populations as a priori subjects thereof, all of which 
must be defined by their physical/embodied properties alone.
Within these reconsiderations of cyberspace as digitally and networked prac-
tices of place, we can consider Foucault’s insights into what he argues are two, 
contradictory dynamics at work: Those disciplining functions of sociocultural, 
political and economic institutions and second, the effects of security imperatives 
that patrol, co-construct the relationship between interior (domestic) and exterior 
(foreign) realms. For political representatives, intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement, the threat of attack from within, by globally networked aggressors, 
justifies programs that extend rather than restrict invasions into people’s private 
lives and public interactions online and offline. As Elden notes, following 
Foucault, this dual mechanism is a constituent of how the modern nation state is 
interrelated with the history of capitalist economies, and liberal notions of subjec-
tivity and individual rights. It is in these, now published, lectures that Foucault 
makes much more explicit the schizoid manifestations of these procedures not 
only to track, contain and curtail but also to push outwards in the quest for cer-
tainty. Elden notes, “Discipline is centripetal, while security is centrifugal: disci-
pline seeks to regulate everything while security seeks to regulate as little as 
possible…; discipline is isolating, working on measures of segmentation, while 
security seeks to incorporate, and to distribute more widely” (Elden, citing 
Foucault, 2007: 565, see also Foucault 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).
Whilst at present there is only circumstantial evidence to suggest that this double 
movement is being coordinated in the sense of an ideological program (Topak 2014; 
Pugliese 2013), its contradictory consequences are being thrown into relief at EU 
borderzones. This is where citizens coming and going, as well as refugee popula-
tions coming and going confront the forces of national security (intelligence and 
data mining, meta-data gathering and predictive programs for anti-terrorism 
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programs) as they work with those of national sovereignty (customs officers, border 
guards, immigration detention centres, public service record-keeping). The point 
that bears repeating is the prevalence for outsourcing of these “services” to private 
firms. The EU Border Agency, Frontex, whilst answerable to the European Council, 
can be supported (as is currently the case) or called to account by the European 
Parliament.
Summing up, apparatuses of border/national/cybersecurity push outwards in a 
series of centrifugal effects as they refine a matrix of physical and digitally 
encoded forms of deterrence and containment. To this end, the externalization of 
bordering, by setting up detention centres in other jurisdictions (from Libya to the 
Pacific island of Nauru), and systems of extra-terrestrialization (satellite tech-
nologies) become “standard operating procedure” rather than techno-legal excep-
tions. Agreements to exchange knowledge via databases that are made up of 
people’s personal communications and other indicators of identity (e.g. as is the 
case in a series of undertakings with Interpol and Europol) are becoming par-for-
the-course, despite the comprehensive regulations around data retention at the 
EU level encapsulated in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that 
came into force in May 2018. As is the case with any schizoid state, the opposing 
effects can be seen in these scenarios through the deployment of existing and 
cutting-edge strategies of mass online surveillance that reinforce digitalized, net-
worked operations of pursuit and prosecution. These operations also target citi-
zenries, now under 24/7 surveillance, online and on the street, as well as those 
arriving at or having crossed the border without the prerequisite forms of legiti-
macy. These centripetal effects corral and monitor people at home and people on 
the move whilst pushing the terms of engagement outwards – centrifugally.
The deployment of tailor-made tools, along with commandeering the databases 
accruing to commercial operators, to track and restrain any targeted population as 
they move, in whatever incarnation, thereby places ordinary citizenries and these 
unwanted others alongside each other. And it puts them in close proximity when it 
comes to the letter of existing human rights law. Debates on the conceptual and 
legal status of cyberspace notwithstanding (Tsagourias 2015; Deibert 2014; Fidler 
2015: 94), the way in which governments, businesses, and ordinary people access 
and enter these (cyber)spaces through Internet-embedded goods and services has 
implications for how human rights and humanitarian law will be interpreted in 
future jurisprudence around asylum and ruling on how fundamental rights and 
freedoms should be protected in online domains.
Resistance at the Online–Offline Nexus
Does this, however, mean that there is no possibility to resist, to fight back and 
change the terms of debate if not rules of the current game on the ground (e.g. in 
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detention centres, camps or at borders where physical violence is being perpetrated 
if not condoned) or online (where detainees are refused adequate Internet access or 
access to digital services that can support their applications)? If so, what is the future 
in digital settings of “methods that citizens and public and private organizations 
[might use] to control domestic and international state crime, caused by individual 
countries and their respective crime-producing agencies” (Ross 2000: 2)? For under-
standing and devising programs of resistance that include online articulations that 
deploy digital tools and web services (e.g. smartphones to blogs or social media 
platforms), one task is to ascertain at which point these schizoid, characteristics 
become dysfunctional. Resistance, therefore, cannot be undertaken or analysed in 
simple binaries, for example, online versus on-the-ground actions. There are many 
examples of individual or community organization supporting refugees to show soli-
darity in acts of kindness or breaking the law by helping refugees even if the general 
media and political tenor of late has been one of unmitigated hostility. So, here, as I 
noted above, it is not sufficient to evoke reasonable publics, as a self-evident mod-
erating force. Mobilization and awareness campaigns against the political crimes 
that are being perpetrated in the Aegean, the Mediterranean and on the land routes 
that cross the internal European borders have yet to gain traction or emerge as a 
transnational countermanding voice within the EU at least. That said, and because 
mobilization often starts in small ways and at different levels of analysis and inter-
vention, it is possible to consider how resistance in a digitally embedded context can 
take place in a myriad of ways and by any means available; from providing guerrilla-
like WiFi connections at the border, or phone batteries and chargers, to fighting 
disproportionate forms of cybersecurity and surveillance legislation in national and 
international courts, to developing cross-border and cross-sector education and 
organizational strategies to change public and political opinion.
This potential can be overlooked when focusing on the increasingly hi-tech, 
“smart” bordering practices of border gatekeeping. For example, stretching back to 
the early years of Internet media and communications last century, the record 
shows how alternative, independent media outlets report incidents, call perpetrators 
of violence and other abuses to account by bearing witness online, by deploying 
and repurposing commercial platforms or open-source tools, or occupying spaces 
on the web to organize and express localized and international condemnation of 
how border agencies abuse the human rights of those stuck at the border. If deaths 
at the border, at sea and within detention centres can be seen as an international 
crime and agencies contracted by state signatories to international human rights 
conventions considered as accomplices, then resistance can take place in the courts 
as well as on the streets, or through social media. For organizing resistance, within 
and across physical and digitally encoded borders, as well as in specific locales 
where local groups can interact with those populations needing assistance, the 
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offline–online nexus needs addressing in a strategic way. The digitization of 
Fortress Europe needs its riposte in technologically and media-savvy responses to 
human rights abuses in order to generate the sort of critical mass that can support 
activist and scholarly approaches to tackling the intersection of state crime, human-
itarian crises and their digital, networked manifestations, approaches that can work 
within the paradigm of “dialectical legal pluralism” (Ward and Green 2016).
In Conclusion
To conclude, let me recapitulate the key themes of this reflection on state crime and 
digital resistance from the perspective of the 65 million people who are forcibly 
displaced around the world. First, if the statistics of death and suffering around the 
ever-expanding juridical borders of Fortress Europe can be apprehended as playing 
out in both multi-sited and multilayered techno-legal domains, then state culpability 
needs to be regarded also in terms of collectives given the links between government 
outsourcing and abuses of fundamental rights and freedoms by these state proxies. 
This entails including the actions of private, for-profit concerns that are answerable to 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies. This working reality thereby implies a 
need to develop conceptual frameworks that can consider abuses of international law 
in ways that include states but do not exclude their accomplices on a legal technicality. 
Second, it is time to reconsider bordered territories in ways that do not denote neces-
sarily physical landmasses; maritime borders and airspace matter in this context as do 
the geopolitical standoffs unfolding at present with regard to ownership and control of 
cyberspace as governments both vie and collaborate with corporate powerbrokers of 
Internet access, terms of use and services. The historical and digitally reconfigured 
(cyber)borders of Europe are zones of violence that witness daily the abrogation of 
human rights offline but also online. Politicized justifications for psychological and 
physical violence underscore the push-and-pull of centripetal discipline and centrifu-
gal security imperatives. This both exacerbates and enhances the underlying schizoid 
tendencies of the Westphalian state system in the face of intractable human suffering.
Echoing the conclusions of Ward and Green (2016) in their rethinking of state 
crime as a multiplex category and domain, critical scholarship that hopes to influence 
policymakers and judiciaries needs to take the lead in several respects. First, to 
develop robust modes of analysis that can shift the political payoff of binaries that 
feed xenophobic and racist public discourses on one hand and, on the other, dismiss 
human rights activism at the online–offline nexus as irrelevant (Franklin 2018). Next, 
there needs to be not just theoretical but also ongoing activist and political work to 
change the social meaning of various forms of protest against human rights abuses, 
wherever they occur, in ways that can fully include the digital. Whilst bodies remain 
the target of privatized as well as officially condoned violence, administrative 
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negligence and public indifference to the plight of thousands currently stuck in refu-
gee camps, held indefinitely in detention centres or those sleeping rough along the 
EU’s now infamous refugee highways, the digital ramifications need considering 
also as a “multileveled legal space” (Ward and Green 2016: 229, emphasis added). 
State crime theory and research can then develop ways of analysing emerging case 
law to multiply singular notions of liability past state-centric legalities and so start to 
incorporate the online–offline dimensions of gathering evidence on any criminal acts 
by (regulatory and private) perpetrators or their accomplices.
As judiciaries might take on board these considerations as they interpret inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law, the other side of the coin is that 
thinking “past the state” in this regard can support social media and other cam-
paigns on behalf of those who have died or suffer “living-death” conditions in 
detention or bureaucratic limbo.15 These insights can also support the funding and 
dissemination of the outcome of investigative journalism and provide resources 
for local, community education where asylum seekers and detention camps or 
centres are located. Only then, can substantive and legally authoritative alterna-
tives gather critical mass to counter the toxicity of political and public discourses 
that construct (the right to) asylum, migration and multicultural expressions of 
citizenship as a security or cultural threat. This means theorizing and researching 
as well along multi-dimensional axes of analysis and response – scholarly, legal, 
advocacy and policy-based. It means accepting the interplay between the digital 
and the networked as integral to the power dialectics of future human rights juris-
prudence in the post-Westphalian cyberscapes of this century.
Notes
 1. The Schengen Agreement, “Europe’s borderlands club” as Howden and Fotiadis (2017) put it.
 2. In 2015, the UN Refugee Agency (the UNHCR) pronounced the situation as critical (Howden and 
Fotiadis 2017). That said, use of the term “refugee crisis” has its critics (Møller, in Ridley 2016).
 3. From “Mission and Tasks” at https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-tasks/ (emphasis 
added). More details on the legal status of Frontex is at https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/
legal-basis/.
 4. This article draws on digital storytelling work for the international research project, Deathscapes: 
Mapping Race and Violence in Settler Societies (https://www.deathscapes.org/). Thanks to Raed 
Yacoub for the research support and Saeb Kasm for the constructive feedback.
 5. The work of the Forensic Architecture research group, open-source journalism from the 
Bellingcat online collective and the Centre of Investigative Journalism are three cases in point.
 6. Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2016/C 202/02) 
articulate obligations to respect the rights of refugees under other international conventions, 
including non-refoulement, that is, not sending people back to places that cannot guarantee their 
safety. Article 4 states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.”
REFUGEES AND THE (DIGITAL) GATEKEEPERS OF “FORTRESS EUROPE” 95
Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals www.plutojournals.com/scj/
 7. Google, for instance, processes the personal data of a billion people per day. And like Google 
with its search engine and web services, Facebook still can claim that two billion, two in seven 
people on the planet, are registered as a member of its global “community” of “netizens”.
 8. This literature on state crime addresses the ethnocentric dimensions to liberal, Western traditions of 
international law to consider the notion of “rule of law” as more than the sum of litigation, legal com-
pliance or policing. Its inclusion of non-Western understandings of justice allows for considerations of 
collective responsibility, prosecutions, presentation of evidence based on, not just written documenta-
tion or compliance with the strict letter of the law, assessing the effects of inaction as well as actions.
 9. Ewan McLeod, Head of Policy Development at the UNHCR public lecture, Goldsmiths 
University of London, 25 November 2015.
10. The case of toddler Alan Kurdi, whose family were fleeing the civil war in Syria, is the most 
high-profile example to date. A photo of his body washed up on a Greek beach took on a life of 
its own by becoming a social media “meme” in an emerging online iconography of death and sur-
vival at sea. For more details, see Alan Kurdi and the Boat on the Deathscapes website; https://
www.deathscapes.org/case-studies/alan-kurdi-and-the-boat.
11. Here a grey area in the wording of the 1951 Refugee Convention, about how the circumstances that 
lead to geographical unevenness can be alleviated, accompanies an ongoing lack of clarity on the legal 
parameters of search and rescue. This makes it difficult to ascertain responsibility under law, to call any 
one state to account for not fulfilling their humanitarian obligations as these shift along the maritime 
borders that delineate national from international waters (Heller and Pezzani 2015; Den Hertog 2012).
12. One example is Qisetna: Talking Syria, http://talkingsyria.com/; another is the Euro-
Mediterranean Resources Network, http://euromernet.org/. The UN Migration Agency, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and their awareness-raising campaigns on social 
media outlets like Twitter, @UNmigration, for another modality. See Topak (2017) and other 
contributions to this Special Issue.
13. A reconstruction of the death of Jimmy Mubenga, and the role of G4S, is available on the 
Deathscapes website; Jimmy Mubenga and the Plane, https://www.deathscapes.org/case-studies/
jimmy-mubenga-case-study/.
14. The literature on the phenomenological dimensions to the embedding of digital technologies and 
computer networking in everyday life, business and politics is longstanding and multidiscipli-
nary. I discuss these debates in Franklin (2013).
15. Thanks to Raed Yacoub for bringing this point to my attention.
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